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Incorporating consumption indivisibilities into the Krugman model, we show that an
importer’s per capita income becomes a primary determinant of “export zeros”. Households
in the rich North (poor South) are willing to pay high (low) prices for consumer goods;
hence unconstrained monopoly pricing generates arbitrage opportunities for internationally
traded products. Export zeros arise because some northern firms abstain from exporting
to the South, to avoid international arbitrage. We show that rich countries benefit from a
trade liberalization, while poor countries lose. These results hold also under more general
preferences with extensive and intensive consumption margins. Disaggregated trade data
show a robust negative association between export zeros and (potential) importers’ per
capita income. This evidence is consistent with the predictions of our model.
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1 Introduction
We study a model of international trade in which an importer’s per capita income is a primary
determinant of the extensive margin of international trade. Two facts motivate our analysis.
First, there are huge di↵erences in per capita incomes across the globe and these di↵erences may
have important consequences for patterns of international trade via the demand side. Second,
per capita incomes of destination countries correlate strongly with the extensive margin of
trade. In 2007, for example, the probability that the US exports a given HS 6-digit product to a
high-income country was 63.4 percent, while the export probabilities to an upper-middle, lower-
middle, and low-income destination were only 48.8 percent, 36.6 percent, and 13.6 percent,
respectively. Furthermore, also US firm-level data show a positive correlation between export
probabilities and destinations’ per capita incomes (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2009).
Recent research has emphasized the presence of “zeros” in bilateral trade data, see e.g.
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007) at the country-pair level; Hummels and Klenow (2005)
at the product level; and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) at the firm level.
However, the literature did not systematically explore the role of per capita incomes. The
standard explanation for export zeros relies on heterogeneous firms and fixed export-market
entry costs (Melitz 2003, Chaney 2008, Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare 2012). Export
zeros arise if a firm’s marginal costs are too high and/or export market size (in terms of
aggregate GDP) is too low to cover the fixed export costs.1 Importantly, there is no separate
role for per capita incomes. This is because of the assumption of homothetic preferences: it is
irrelevant whether a given aggregate GDP arises from a large population and a low per capita
income, or vice versa.
Our paper provides an alternative approach to explain export zeros in which the demand
side plays the crucial role. In particular, we elaborate the idea that low per capita incomes
are associated with low willingnesses to pay for di↵erentiated products, so that firms abstain
from exporting to poor destinations. Our emphasis on the demand channel does not only
lead to new predictions on trade patterns. It has also important implications for consumer
welfare. Our model predicts that poor countries may lose from a trade liberalization, while
rich countries always gain. This is di↵erent from standard models where gains from trade are
more evenly distributed and all trading partners typically benefit from a trade liberalization.
We start out with a simple model that is identical to the basic Krugman (1980) framework,
except that consumer goods are indivisible and households purchase either one unit of a partic-
ular product or do not purchase it at all. Such “0-1” preferences generate, in a straightforward
way, a situation where a household’s willingness to pay for di↵erentiated products depends on
household income. However, 0-1 preferences are very stylized, as households can adjust their
consumption in response to price and income changes only through the extensive margin.2 We
1This heterogeneous-firm framework has proven to be useful in explaining firm-level evidence on export
behavior. For a recent survey, see Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2012).
2Notice that “0-1” preferences and CES preferences can be considered as two polar cases. With 0-1 pref-
erences, optimal consumption responds only along the extensive margin; with CES-preferences consumption
responds only along the intensive margin (because Inada conditions induce households to consume all goods,
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then show that the qualitative results of the 0-1 model carry over to more general settings
where consumption is allowed to respond both along the extensive and the intensive margin.
Our paper makes two key contributions. The first is the recognition that firms from rich
countries might not export to a poor country due to a threat of international arbitrage. Con-
sider a US firm that sells its product both in the US and in China. Suppose this firm charges
a price in China equal to the Chinese households’ (low) willingness to pay and a price in the
US equal to the US households’ (high) willingness to pay. When price di↵erences are large,
arbitrage opportunities emerge: arbitrageurs can purchase the good cheaply on the Chinese
market, ship it back to the US, and underbid local US producers. In equilibrium, US firms an-
ticipate the threat of arbitrage and will adjust accordingly. To avoid arbitrage, a US exporter
has basically two options: (i) charge a price in the US su ciently low to eliminate arbitrage
incentives; or (ii) abstain from selling the product in China (and other equally poor countries)
thus eliminating arbitrage opportunities. These two options involve a trade-o↵ between market
size and prices: firms that export globally have a large market but need to charge a low price;
firms that sell exclusively on the US market (and in other equally rich countries) can charge
a high price but have a small market. In an equilibrium with ex-ante identical firms, the two
options yield the same profit.
The second key contribution of our paper relates to gains from trade and the welfare e↵ects
of trade liberalizations. When per capita income gaps are small, firms are not constrained by
arbitrage, and all goods are traded. In such a “full trade equilibrium”, lower trade costs increase
welfare in both countries. Lower losses during transport provide ressources for production of
more varieties from which consumers in both countries benefit. In the more interesting case
of large per capita income gaps, firms are constrained by arbitrage, and not all goods are
exported to the poor country. In such an “arbitrage equilibrium” lower trade costs increase
welfare in the rich country but decrease welfare in the poor country. The reason is that lower
trade costs tighten the arbitrage constraint. With lower trade costs, globally active firms in
the rich country need to reduce prices on their home market. This will induce more firms to
abstain from exporting to poor countries, thus avoiding international arbitrage. As a result,
fewer varieties are exported to poor countries leading to lower consumption and welfare in
these countries.
Our analysis highlights three further points. First, we make precise the di↵erential conse-
quences of an increase in aggregate GDP due to a higher per capita income and due to a larger
population. A higher per capita income in the South raises poor households’ willingness to
pay, increasing northern firms’ incentive to sell their products internationally. In equilibrium,
a larger fraction of northern firms export their product to the South. In contrast, a larger pop-
ulation in the South leaves southern households’ demand for varieties unchanged but allows
for the production of more varieties. This increases the world’s per capita consumption due
to a scale e↵ect; increases the volume of trade; and may or may not increase trade intensity.
Moreover, a larger population in the poor country may or may not increase the probability
irrespective of prices and income). Clearly, the realistic scenario is in between these polar cases. We look at
this case in Section 5.
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that a northern firm exports to the South. In sum, our model predicts that per capita income
has a stronger e↵ect than population size on the probability that a northern firm exports to
the South.
A second point shows that the result of detrimental e↵ects of trade liberalizations (on a
poor country’s welfare) needs to be qualified in a multi-country setting. When there are many
rich and many poor countries, a multilateral trade liberalization still reduces North-South trade
due to tighter arbitrage. However, it also stimulates South-South trade because the arbitrage
constraint is not binding among trading partners with similar per capita incomes. Hence
a multilateral trade liberalization increases the welfare of poor households if the increase in
South-South trade overcompensates the fall in North-South trade. The multi-country setting
is also useful because it delivers empirical predictions. The main prediction (which we test
empirically) is that a northern firm has a high probability to export to other northern countries,
while the probability that it exports to a southern country is significantly lower and decreases
in the per capita income gap between the North and South.
A third point analyzes the conditions under which the basic logic of our 0-1 preferences
carries over to general (additive) preferences that allow for both an extensive and intensive
margin of consumption. We assume a general, additive subutility function v(c) and make pre-
cise the conditions on v(c) under which international arbitrage can emerge. If these conditions
are met, there will be export zeros, provided that per capita income di↵erences between the
trading partners are su ciently large. In this sense, the predictions of the simple 0-1 model
hold also under more general preferences.
To explore the empirical relevance of the arbitrage channel, we proceed in two steps. We
first look at disaggregate trade data for US exports. In particular, we find that the probability
that the US exports a HS6-digit product-category to an arbitrarily chosen destination increases
in the destination’s per capita income, conditional on the destination’s aggregate GDP (and
other commonly used determinants of international trade flows). The impact of a destination’s
per capita income is highly statistically significant and quantitatively important. We then
undertake a simple calibration exercise. We show that the model can match the US export
probability to a typical poor country under realistic parameter values. Moreover, the model
generates a positive relationship between the export probability and a destination’s per capita
income. It turns out, however, that the relationship generated by the model is stronger than
the one observed in the data. We argue that this an artefact of the symmetry assumption.
Adding relevant heterogeneities (unequally productive firms and/or unequally rich consumers)
reduces excess sensitivity and brings the predictions of the model closer to the data. We
conclude that the arbitrage channel is potentially relevant for explaining the extensive margin
of trade between rich and poor countries.
The present paper connects to various strands of the literature. First, it is related to
the literature on pricing-to-market, which focuses on the cross-country dispersion of prices
of tradable goods. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) generate pricing-to-market in a model with
Cournot competition and variable mark-ups. However, their focus is on the interaction of
market structure and changes in marginal costs rather than on per capita income e↵ects. Hsieh
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and Klenow (2007), Manova and Zhang (2009), and Alessandria and Kaboski (2011), among
others, document that prices of tradable consumer goods show a strong positive correlation with
per capita incomes in cross-country data. Simonovska (2011) provides a theoretical framework
in which richer consumers are less price-sensitive, so mark-ups and prices are higher in richer
countries. A similar mechanism is also at work in the papers by Markusen (2011), Saure´
(2010), Behrens and Murata (2012a,b) and Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin (2011). Neary
and Mra´zova´ (2013) explore in a comprehensive way how deviations from CES preferences
a↵ect equilibrium outcomes in the Krugman model.3 Variable mark-ups and pricing-to-market
driven by per capita income are also a crucial feature in our framework. Our paper extends
this literature by showing that export zeros arise from the (threat of) international arbitrage,
a feature not considered in previous papers.
Second, the paper is related to the literature on parallel trade (surveyed in Maskus, 2000 and
Ganslandt and Maskus, 2007).4 The key di↵erence lies in our emphasis on the role of general
equilibrium e↵ects. In partial equilibrium models, the welfare e↵ects of parallel imports in a
rich country are typically ambiguous because there is a tradeo↵ between reduced innovation
incentives on the one side and lower prices for consumers on the other side. To see the contrast,
consider for example the recent contribution by Roy and Saggi (2012). They show that in an
international duopoly, parallel trade induces the southern firm to charge an above monopoly
price in the South in order to be able to charge a high price in the North. Softer competition
in the North then induces the northern firm to sell only in its home market at a high price,
which harms northern consumers. We show that considering the general equilibrium uncovers
an opposing force working through the economy wide resource constraint: It is still true that
a subset of northern firms will find it optimal to sell only in their home market at a high price.
But this means that less northern resources are used to produce goods for the South, which
increases the numbers of available varieties in the North and thus welfare. So the welfare e↵ects
of parallel trade rules go in the opposite direction when considering the general equilibrium.
Third, the presence of a trade participation margin links the present paper to a literature
that builds on Melitz (2003) and explores demand- and/or market-size e↵ects in the context of
heterogeneous firm models. Arkolakis (2010) incorporates marketing costs into that framework,
generating an e↵ect of population size on export markets in addition to aggregate income.
Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) extend this framework, allowing for demand shocks (in
3Other papers extending the Krugman-framework and allowing for non-homothetic (or quasi-homothetic)
preferences include Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009), Desdoigts
and Jaramillo (2009), Neary (2009), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Auer, Chaney and Saure´ (2014). Many
empirical papers found support for non-homotheticities, e.g. Hunter and Markusen (1988), Hunter (1991),
Francois and Kaplan (1996), Choi, Hummels, and Xiang (2006), Dalgin, Mitra, and Trindade (2008), Fieler
(2011), Hepenstrick (2011), and Bernasconi (2013).
4There is compelling evidence that threats of arbitrage a↵ect the pricing decisions of firms in many markets.
Pharmaceutical industries are most prominent (WHO 2001, Ganslandt and Maskus 2004, Goldberg 2010). The
WHO (2001) report argues that restraints on parallel trade between poor and rich countries would allow compa-
nies to supply the former. Consequently, a key WHO recommendation is a more comprehensive implementation
of di↵erential pricing strategies. Parallel trade is also relevant in other industries such as cars (Lutz 2004, Yeung
and Mok 2013), consumer electronics (Feng 2013), DVDs and cinemas (Burgess and Evans 2005), and other
markets, like clothing and cosmetics (NERA 1999).
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addition to cost shocks) as further determinants of firms’ export behavior. These papers stick
to homothetic preferences, hence arbitrage cannot arise. This is di↵erent from our paper
where non-homotheticities and arbitrage incentives play a central role, and no exogenous firm
heterogeneity is required to generate a trade participation margin.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the basic
assumptions and discuss the autarky equilibrium. In Section 3, we use our basic framework to
study trade patterns and trade gains in a two-country setting. Section 4 extends the analysis
to many rich and poor countries. In Section 5, we introduce general preferences and show that
arbitrage equilibria also arise when consumption responds both along the extensive and the
intensive margin. Section 6 presents empirical evidence from disaggregated US trade data and
calibrates the model to these data. Section 7 concludes.
2 Autarky
We start by presenting the autarky equilibrium. The economy is populated by P identical
households. Each household is endowed with L units of labor, the only production factor.
Labor is perfectly mobile within countries and immobile across countries. The labor market is
competitive and the wage is W. Production requires a fixed labor input F to set up a new firm
and a variable labor input 1/a to produce one unit of output, the same for all firms. Producing
good j in quantity q(j) thus requires a total labor input of F + q (j) /a.
Consumers. Households spend their income on a continuum of di↵erentiated goods. We
assume that goods are indivisible and a given product j yields positive utility only for the first
unit and zero utility for any additional units.5 Thus consumption is a binary choice: either you
buy or you don’t buy. Let x(j) denote an indicator that takes value 1 if good j is purchased
and value 0 if not. Then utility takes the simple form
U =
ˆ 1
0
x(j)dj, where x(j) 2 {0, 1} . (1)
Notice that utility is additively separable and that the various goods enter symmetrically.
Hence the household’s utility is given by the number of consumed goods.
Consider a household with income y who chooses among (a measure of) N goods supplied
at prices {p(j)}.6 The problem is to choose {x(j)} to maximize the objective function (1)
subject to the budget constraint
´ N
0 p(j)x(j)dj = y. Denoting   as the household’s marginal
5Preferences of this type were used, inter alia, by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) to study demand
composition and technology choices, by Matsuyama (2000) to explore non-homotheticities in Ricardian trade,
and by Falkinger (1994) and Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller (2006) to analyze inequality and growth.
6Notice that the integral in (1) runs from zero to infinity. While preferences are defined over an infinitely
large measure of potential goods, the number of goods actually supplied is limited by firm entry, i.e. only a
subset of potentially producible goods can be purchased at a finite price.
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utility of income, the first order condition can be written as
x(j) = 1 if 1    p (j)
x(j) = 0 if 1 <  p (j) .
Rewriting this condition as 1/    p (j) yields the simple rule that the household will purchase
good j if its willingness to pay 1/  does not fall short of the price p(j).7 The resulting demand
curve, depicted in Figure 1, is a step function which coincides with the vertical axis for p(j) >
1/  and equals unity for prices p(j)  1/ .
F igure 1
By symmetry, the household’s willingness to pay is the same for all goods and equal to
the inverse of  , which itself is determined by the household’s income and product prices.
Intuitively, the demand curve shifts up when the income of the consumer increases (  falls)
and shifts down when the price level of all other goods increases (  rises).
It is interesting to note the di↵erence between consumption choices under these “0-1”
preferences and the standard CES-case. With 0-1 preferences, the household chooses how many
goods to buy, while there is no choice about the consumed quantity.8 In constrast, a household
has a choice with CES preferences about the quantities of the supplied goods, but finds it
optimal to consume all varieties in positive amounts. This is because Inada conditions imply
an infinite reservation price. In other words, 0-1 preferences shift the focus to the extensive
margin of consumption, while CES preferences focus entirely on the intensive margin. It is
important to note, however, that our central results below do not depend on the 0-1 assumption.
In fact, we will show below that more general preferences – which allow for both the extensive
and the intensive margin of consumption – generate results that are qualitatively similar to
those derived in the 0-1 case.
Equilibrium. Since both firms and households are identical, the equilibrium is symmetric.
Similiar to the standard monopolistic competition model, the information on other firms’ prices
is summarized in the shadow price  . Hence, the pricing decision of a monopolistic firm depends
only on  . Moreover, the value of   is una↵ected by the firm’s own price because a single firm
is of measure zero.
Lemma 1 There is a single price p = 1/  in all markets and all goods are purchased by all
consumers.
7Strictly speaking, the condition 1    p(j) is necessary but not su cient for c(j) = 1 and the condition
1 <  p(j) is su cient but not necessary for c(j) = 0. This is because purchasing all goods for which 1 =  p(j)
may not be feasible given the consumer’s budget. For when N di↵erent goods are supplied at the same price
p but y < pN the consumer randomly selects which particular good will be purchased or not purchased. This
case, however, never emerges in the general equilibrium.
8The discussion here rules out the case where incomes could be larger than pN , meaning that the consumer
is subject to rationing (i.e. he would want to purchase more goods than are actually available at the available
prices). While this could be a problem in principle, it will never occur in equilibrium.
7
Proof. Aggregate demand for good j is a function of   only. Consequently, the pricing
decision of a monopolistic firm depends on the value of   and not directly on the prices set
by competitors in other markets. Thus, it is profit maximising to set p(j) = 1/  as long as
1/  exceeds marginal costs. To prove the second part of the Lemma, assume to the contrary
that only a fraction ⌫ of consumers purchases the product at price p(j) = p = 1/ . However,
this cannot be an equilibrium, as the firm could undercut the price slightly and sell to all
consumers.
Each monopolistic firm faces a demand curve as depicted in Figure 1. It will charge a price
equal to the representative consumer’s willingness to pay p = 1/  and sell output of quantity
1 to each of the P households. Without loss of generality, we choose labor as the nume´raire,
W = 1. Two conditions characterize the autarky equilibrium. The first is the zero-profit
condition, ensuring that operating profits cover the entry costs but do not exceed them to deter
further entry. Entry costs are FW = F and operating profits are [p W/a]P = [p  1/a]P.
The zero-profit condition can be written as p = (aF + P) /aP. This implies a mark-up µ – a
ratio of price over marginal cost – equal to
µ =
aF + P
P .
Notice that technology parameters a and F and the market size parameter P determine the
mark-up.9 We will show below that the mark-up is a crucial channel through which non-
homothetic preferences a↵ect patterns of trade and the international division of labor.
The second equilibrium condition is a resource constraint ensuring that there is full em-
ployment PL = FN + PN/a. From this latter equation, equilibrium product diversity (both
in production and consumption) in the decentralized equilibrium is given by
N =
aP
aF + PL.
3 Trade between a rich and a poor country
Let us now consider a world economy where a rich and a poor country trade with each other.
We denote variables of the rich country with superscript R and those of the poor country with
superscript P . To highlight the relative importance of di↵erences in per capita incomes and
population sizes, we let the two countries di↵er along both dimensions, hence LR > LP and
9Notice that the determination of mark-ups is quite di↵erent between the 0-1 outcome and the standard
CES-case. With 0-1 preferences, the mark-up depends on technology and market size parameters. With CES
preferences, the mark-up is determined by the elasticity of substitution between di↵erentiated goods, while it
is independent of technology and market size. Notice further that, from the zero profit condition of the CES-
model, we have !F = (p  !/b)xP (where x is the – endogenously determined – quantity of the representative
product and 1/b is the unit labor requirement). Thus we can write the mark-up as (b/x)(F/P) + 1, which
compares to a(F/P) + 1 in the 0-1 case. To achieve realistic mark-ups in empirical applications, the parameter
a needs to be normalized appropriately, i.e. it has to assume an order of magnitude similar to the ratio b/x in
the CES-model.
8
PR R PP . We assume trade is costly and of the standard iceberg type: for each unit sold to a
particular destination, ⌧ > 1 units have to be shipped and ⌧ 1 units are lost during transport.
3.1 Full trade equilibrium
When the income gap between the two countries is small, all goods are traded internationally.
In such a full trade equilibrium, a firm’s optimal price for a di↵erentiated product in country
i = R,P equals the households’ willingnesses to pay (see Figure 1), hence we have pR = 1/ R
and pP = 1/ P . Since country R is wealthier than country P , we have  R <  P and pR > pP .
By symmetry, the prices of imported and home-produced goods are identical within each
country.
Solving for the full trade equilibrium is straightforward. Consider the resource constraint
in the rich country. NRF labor units are needed for setting up the NR firms. Moreover,
NRPR/a and NRPP ⌧/a labor units are employed in production to serve the home and the
foreign market, respectively. Since each of the PR households supplies LR units of labor
inelastically, the resource constraint is PRLR = NRF +NR  PR + ⌧PP   /a. Similarly, for the
poor country. Solving for N i (i = R,P ) lets us determine the number of active firms in the
two countries
N i =
aP i
aF + (P i + ⌧P i)L
i, (2)
(where  i = P if i = R and vice versa).
Now consider the zero-profit conditions in the two countries. An internationally active
firm from country i generates total revenues equal to pRPR + pPPP and has total costs
W i
⇥
F + (P i + ⌧P i)/a⇤. Using the zero-profit conditions of the two countries lets us cal-
culate relative wages
! ⌘ W
P
WR
=
aF + ⌧PP + PR
aF + PP + ⌧PR . (3)
When the two countries di↵er in population size, wages (per e ciency unit of labor) are higher
in the larger country.10 Why are wages higher in larger countries? The reason is that labor
is more productive in a larger country. To see this, consider the amount of labor needed by a
firm in country i to serve the world market. When country R is larger than country P , firms
in country R need less labor to serve the world market because there are less iceberg losses
during transportation, which is reflected in relative wages. There are two cases in which wages
are equalized: (i) ⌧ = 1. When there are no trade costs, the productivity e↵ect of country size
vanishes. (ii) PP = PR. When the two countries are of equal size, productivity di↵erences
vanish because iceberg losses become equally large. Note further that ⌧ 1 < ! < ⌧ . When the
poor country becomes very large, iceberg losses as a percentage of total costs become negligible,
! ! ⌧ . Similarly, when the rich country becomes large, ! ! ⌧ 1.
10While ! measures relative wages per e ciency unit of labor, !LP /LR measures relative nominal per capita
incomes. In principle, !LP /LR > 1 is possible, so that country P (with the lower labor endowment) has the
higher per capita income. We show below that this can happen only in a full trade equilibrium but not in an
arbitrage equilibrium. The latter case is the interesting one in the present context.
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Finally, let us calculate prices and mark-ups in the respective export destination. The
budget constraint of a household in country i is W iLi = pi
 
NR +NP
 
. Combining the zero-
profit condition with these budget restrictions and the above equation for the number of firms,
lets us express the price in country i as
pi =W iLi
aF + PR + ⌧PP
aPRLR + a!PPLP , i = R,P. (4)
By symmetry, prices for the various goods are identical within each country, irrespective of
whether they are produced at home or abroad. Consequently, imported goods generate a lower
mark-up than locally produced goods because exporters cannot pass trade costs through to
consumers.11 Marginal costs are W i/a when the product is sold in the home market and
⌧W i/a when the product is sold in the foreign market. Hence mark-ups (prices over marginal
costs) are µiD = p
ia/W i in the domestic market and µiX = p
ja/(W i⌧) in the export market.
Hence a full trade equilibrium is characterized as follows: (i) NP /NR = !PPLP /  PRLR ,
i.e. di↵erences in aggregate GDP lead to proportional di↵erences in produced varieties; (ii)
pP /pR = !LP /LR, i.e. di↵erences in per capita incomes generate proportional di↵erences in
prices; and (iii) µPD/µ
R
D = µ
P
X/µ
R
X = L
P /LR < 1, i.e. di↵erences in per capita endowments
lead to proportional di↵erences in mark-ups.
Patterns of international trade. Let us highlight how the volume and structure of inter-
national trade depend on relative per capita endowments LP /LR. We define “trade intensity”
  as the ratio between the value of world trade and world GDP. In a full trade equlibrium the
value of world trade is given by pRNPPR + pPNRPP while world income is LRPR + !LPPR.
Trade intensity is given by
  =
2LRPR · !LPPP
(LRPR + !LPPP )2
When all goods are traded, the relative size of aggregate GDP matters for trade intensity.
When GDP di↵ers strongly across the two countries, trade intensity is small as most world
production takes place in the large country and most of this production is also consumed in
this country. Trade intensity is maximized when the two countries are of exactly equal size.
We can now state the following proposition
Proposition 1 Assume the two countries are in a full trade equilibrium. a) All goods are
traded. b) Trade intensity   increases with both the per capita endowment LP and population
size PP if !LPPP < LRPR. c) The impact on   of PP is stronger than the one of LP . d) A
trade liberalization increases trade intensity if !LPPP < LRPR.
PROOF. See Appendix A.
11This is di↵erent from CES preferences, where transportation costs are more than passed through to prices
as exporters charge a fixed mark-up on marginal costs (including transportation). Notice that limited cost
pass-through has been documented in a large body of empirical evidence.
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Trade and welfare. Let us finally consider the gains from trade and the welfare e↵ects of a
trade liberalization in a full trade equilibrium. Since all firms sell to all households worldwide,
consumption and welfare levels are equalized across rich and poor countries. Gains from trade
are higher for the country with lower product variety under autarky. Product variety in autarky
is N i = aP iLi/  aF + P i  . The country with a smaller population P i and/or lower per capita
endowment (lower Li) gains more from trade. how a trade liberalization a↵ects welfare. Here
we are interested in how bilateral trade liberalizations a↵ect welfare and the distribution of
trade gains between the two countries. A trade liberalization is modeled as a reduction in
iceberg transportation costs ⌧ .
In a full trade equilibrium, households in both countries purchase all goods produced world-
wide. Hence the welfare levels are identical in both countries despite their unequal endowment
with productive resources
UR = UP =
aLRPR
aF + PR + ⌧PP +
a!LPPP
aF + PR + ⌧PP .
Firms’ price setting behavior drives this result. R-consumers are willing to pay higher prices
than P -consumers because their income is higher. In the full trade equilibrium, higher nominal
incomes translate one-to-one into higher prices, welfare is therefore identical. To see the
mechanism by which welfare is equalized, consider mark-ups in the special case when the
two countries are equally large. When PP = PR, prices are higher in country R, while costs
are the same for each country. In other words, country-R households bear a larger share of
total costs. In this case, the poor country’s welfare is lower under autarky.12 We summarize
this in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a full trade equilibrium, welfare levels are equalized. A trade liberalization
(a lower ⌧) increases welfare for both countries.
Proof. In text.
3.2 “Arbitrage” equilibrium with non-traded goods
Full trade ceases to be an equilibrium when per capita income di↵erences !LP /LR become
large. The reason is a threat of arbitrage. Consider a US firm that sells its product both in the
US and in China. Suppose the firm charges a price in China that equals the Chinese households’
willingness to pay pP = 1/ P and a price in the US that equals the US households’ willingness
to pay pR = 1/ R. If the di↵erence between 1/ P and 1/ R is large, arbitrage opportunities
emerge. Arbitrageurs can purchase the good cheaply on the Chinese market, ship it back to
the US, and underbid the producer on the US market. A threat of arbitrage also concerns
Chinese firms which both produce for the local market and export to the US. When these firm
charge too high prices in the US, arbitrage traders purchase the cheap products in China and
parallel export them to the US.
12This continues to hold as long as PP is not too much larger larger than PR. When PP   PR, so that
!LP > LR, prices become higher in country P . In that case, country-P bears the larger share in total costs.
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Firms anticipate this arbitrage opportunity and adjust their pricing behavior accordingly.
Notice that the threat of parallel trade only constains firms operating on the world market.
Firms that abstain from selling the product in the poor country and focus exclusively on
the market of the rich country do not face such a threat. Adopting this latter strategy im-
plies a smaller market but lets firms exploit the rich households’ high willingness to pay. In
equilibrium, firms are indi↵erent between the two strategies. Notice that concentrating sales
exclusively on the rich market country is, in principle, an option both for producers in the
rich and in the poor country. In equilibrium, however, only by rich-country producers adopt
this strategy. While total revenues are independent of the producer’s location, total costs are
not. To serve households in the rich country, country-R producers face marginal costs WRa,
while country-P exporters face marginal costs WR!⌧/a (they have to bear transportation
costs). Since !⌧ > 1, country-P producers have a competitive disadvantage in serving the rich
country even when the poor country has lower wages ! < 1.
An arbitrage equilibrium looks as follows. A subset of rich-country producers sells their
product exclusively in the rich country, while the remaining rich-country producers sell their
product both in the rich and in the poor country. All poor-country producers sell their product
worldwide. To see why this is an equilibrium, consider the alternative situation in which all
rich-country producers trade their products internationally. If all firms charged a price that
prevents arbitrage, all goods would be priced below rich households’ willingness to pay. In
that case, however, rich households do not spend all their income, generating an infinitely
large willingness to pay for additional products. This would induce country-R firms to sell
their product only on the home market. Thus, in equilibrium, both types of firms will exist.
Notice that all firms are ex-ante identical (i.e. all firms have the same cost- and demand
functions). Notice that there is an indeterminacy concerning the selection of firms into export
status. Clearly, this is an artefact of the symmtry-assumption, which would disappear once
asymmetries (i.e. firm heterogeneities) are added to the model.
We are now ready to solve for the arbitrage equilibrium. Denote the price in the rich
country of traded and non-traded goods by pRT and p
R
N , respectively. The price of non-traded
goods is pRN = 1/ 
R. Anticipating the threat of parallel trade, the price of traded goods may
not exceed and exactly equals the price in the poor country (plus trade costs), pRT = ⌧/ 
P ,
in equilibrium. The price of a product in the poor country is still given by pP = 1/ P . The
following lemma proofs that this is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma In an arbitrage equilibrium, firms that sell their product in both countries (i) set
pP = 1/ P in country P and pRT = ⌧p
P in country R, and (ii) sell to all households in both
countries.
Proof. (i) Assume 1/ P exceeds marginal costs of exporting. In that case, the profit
maximization problem of an exporting firm reduces to maximize total revenue PP pP (j) +
PRpR(j) s.t. ⌧pP (j)   pR(j) and pi(j)  1/ i. Applying Lemma 1, it is profit maximizing to
set pi(j) = 1/ i if ⌧/ P    R (full trade equilibrium). If ⌧/ P <  R, the arbitrage constraint is
binding ⌧pP (j) = pR(j) = pRT and revenues are maximized when p
P (j) = 1/ P . (ii) Assume to
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the contrary that only a fraction ⌫ of consumers purchases the product at price pP (j) = 1/ P .
As in Lemma 1, this cannot be an equilibrium, as the firm would lower pP (j) and pR(j) slightly
and gain the whole market in the poor country.
The zero-profit condition for an internationally active country-i producer is pRTPR+pPPP =
W i
⇥
F + (P i + ⌧P i)/a⇤. These firms’ total revenues do not depend on the location of produc-
tion, but the required labor input depends on location. Di↵erences in population sizes generate
di↵erences in (total) transport costs, and relative wages equalize these di↵erences. From the
zero-profit conditions we see that relative wages ! are still given by equation (3). The zero-
profit conditions also let us derive the prices for the various products. Using pRT = ⌧p
P , we
get
pRT =
⌧
a
aF + PR + ⌧PP
⌧PR + PP and p
P =
1
a
aF + PR + ⌧PP
⌧PR + PP ,
where we have setWR = 1. (We use this normalization throughout the paper.) The zero-profit
condition for an exclusive rich-country producer is pRNPR = F+PR/a, from which we calculate
the equilibrium price of a non-traded variety
pRN =
aF + PR
aPR .
Notice that, due to the arbitrage constraint on exporters’ pricing behavior, prices do not depend
on LP and LR. This is quite di↵erent from the full-trade equilibrium, where price di↵erences
reflect di↵erences in per capita endowments.
The resource constraint in country P is the same as that in the full trade equilibrium, so
NP is still given by (2). The resource constraint in country R is now di↵erent, however, because
there are traded and non-traded products. Denoting the range of traded and non-traded goods
produced in the rich country by NRT and N
R
N , respectively, the resource constraint of country
R is given by PRLR = NRT
 
F + (PR + ⌧PP )/a +NRN  F + PR/a . Together with the trade
balance condition NRT p
PPP = NP pRTPR and the terms of trade pRT /pP = ⌧ we get
NRT =
aPR
aF + ⌧PR + PP ⌧L
P , and NRN =
aPR
aF + PR
 
LR   ⌧!LP   . (5)
Patterns of international trade. Let us now describe volume and structure of interna-
tional trade in an arbitrage equilibrium. The value of traded goods is pRTN
PPR + pPNRT PP
(while world income still is LRPR + !LPPR). Using equations (2) and (5) we calculate the
trade intensity in an arbitrage equilibrium.
  =
2⌧
⌧ + (PP /PR) ·
!LPPP
LRPR + !LPPP (6)
Equation (6) shows that per capita incomes di↵erences and di↵erences in population sizes
a↵ect trade intensity in di↵erent ways. Consider first the impact of a given change in per capita
income of country P . The above expression for   reveals that a higher per capita income of the
13
poor country unambiguously increases the intensity of trade. This is reminiscent of the Linder-
hypothesis (Linder 1961) postulating that a higher similarity in per capita incomes is associated
higher trade between trading partners. The intution for this result is straightforward. When
LP increases by 10 percent, the range of exported goods increases by 10 percent while prices
remain unchanged. Hence the aggregate value of trade pRTN
PPR + pPNRT PP increases by
10 percent as well. In contrast, increasing LP by 10 percent (while leaving LR unchanged)
increases world GDP by less than 10 percent. Trade intensity, the ratio between world trade
and world GDP, thus rises unambiguously.
Now consider a change in population-size of country P . It turns out that a change in PP
has a smaller e↵ect on trade intensity than an increase in relative per capita incomes that
increases GDP by the same magnitude, i.e. we have @log /@ logPP < @ log  /@ logLP . This
can be seen from looking at the volume of world trade which is equal to 2pPNRT PP . An increase
in PP has a direct and an indirect e↵ect on world trade. The direct e↵ect increases trade in
proportion to country P ’s population. The indirect e↵ect lowers per capita imports. Notice
that imports per capita in country-P are equal to pPNRT =
⇥
⌧/(⌧ + PP /PR)⇤!LP . From the
point of view of country R, a larger population in country P requires fewer exports to each
country-P households to cover a given amount of own imports. Hence country-P imports (and
world trade) increase with PP less than proportionately.13
Proposition 3 Assume per capita income di↵erences are large, so that the world economy is
in an arbitrage equilibrium. a) Some firms in country R do not export. b) An increase in per
capita endowment LP raises trade intensity  , while an increase in population size PP may
increase or decrease  . c) The impact on   of PP is weaker than the one of LP . d) A trade
liberalization decreases trade intensity.
PROOF. See Appendix B.
Trade and welfare. We proceed by looking at the impact of trade liberalizations. We first
consider the case where trade costs are symmetric and explore a bilateral liberalization. (We
look at the unilateral case below). In an arbitrage equilibrium, a bilateral trade liberalization
lets consumers’ welfare levels in the two countries diverge. Country-P households’ welfare
equals NRT +N
P , while country-R households’ welfare equals NP +NRT +N
R
N . Using (2) and
(5), these welfare levels are given by
UP =
aLP (PP + ⌧PR)
aF + ⌧PR + PP and U
R =
aLP (PP + ⌧PR)
aF + ⌧PR + PP +
aPR  LR   ⌧LP  
aF + PR .
It is straightforward to verify, that @UP /@⌧ > 0 while @UR/@⌧ < 0. We are now able to state
the following proposition.
13Notice that an increase in PP also increases !. It is shown in the proof of proposition 2 (see Appendix)
that taking the impact of PP on ! into account, an increase in PP still reduces per capita imports.
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Proposition 4 In an arbitrage equilibrium, a trade liberalization increases the welfare of
country-R households, but decreases it for country-P households.
Proof. In text.
Proposition 4 shows the crucial role of trade costs for welfare. Unequal countries have di↵er-
ent preferred trade barriers (or di↵erent preferred degrees of trade liberalizations). Consumers
in the rich country are essentially free-traders, whereas consumers in the poor country are
harmed by liberalizations. What is the intuition behind this result? The reason is country-R
firms’ pricing behavior. As higher trade costs imply a less tight arbitrage constraint, country-
R firms can charge higher prices for traded goods relative to non-traded goods. This induces
country-R firms to export rather than sell exclusively to domestic customers. The result is
an increase in trade intensity which benefits the poor country. Put di↵erently, poor country
households are against a trade liberalization because a lower ⌧ decreases trade and welfare in
country P .
Unilateral trade liberalization. Up to now we have assumed symmetric trade costs across
countries. However, policy makers can influence trade costs through tari↵s and regulations.
This is interesting in the present context because, in an arbitrage equilibrium, the poor country
has an incentive to increase trade barriers and relax the arbitrage constraint. This increases
the supply or northern varieties and hence may raise welfare in the South. It is therefore
interesting to look at an unilateral trade liberalization. Assume that trade costs di↵er between
countries, with ⌧ i denoting iceberg costs for imports into country i. While total revenues of
exporters are still pRTPR+pPPP , now total costs do not only vary as a result of unequally large
populations but also because of di↵erences in transportation costs, W i
⇥
F + (P i + ⌧ iP i)/a⇤.
From the zero-profit condition we derive relative wages ! as
! ⌘ W
P
WR
=
aF + ⌧PPP + PR
aF + PP + ⌧RPR ,
which implies that
 
⌧R
  1
< ! < ⌧P . Assume that income di↵erences are su ciently large,
!LP /LR < ⌧R, so that an arbitrage equilibrium prevails. To prevent arbitrage, the price of
traded goods in the rich country may not exceed the price in the poor country plus transporta-
tion costs, hence firms will charge pRT = ⌧
RpP in the rich country.14
Using zero-profit conditions and resource constraints is it is straightforward to calculate
welfare in the two countries as
UP =
aPP + a⌧RPR
aF + ⌧RPR + PP L
P and UR = UP +
aPR
aF + PR
 
LR   ⌧R!LP   .
Interestingly, a unilateral trade liberalization by the poor country (a fall in ⌧P ) does not have
any e↵ect on poor households, but a↵ects rich households through a fall in !. Lower costs
14To make sure that such an equilibrium exists, we also assume that country-R exporters can charge a price
in country P that covers (production plus transportation) costs, pP > ⌧P /a. This implies ⌧P ⌧R < aF/PR + 1.
If this condition is satisfied also country-P exporters will export, pRT > ⌧
R/a because pRT = ⌧
RpP .
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of exporting to the poor country makes producers in country R more productive, improving
their terms of trade while leaving the arbitrage constraint una↵ected. This saves resources
for country R which are employed to produce non-traded goods. This raises welfare of rich
consumers. In contrast, an unilateral increase in trade barriers into the rich country (a larger
⌧R) harms country-R but benefits country-P households. Hence, our model predicts that a
poor country has an incentive to levy an export tax. This relaxes the arbitrage constraint and
increases the supplied varieties and hence welfare in country P .
3.3 Existence of equilibria
The conditions under which the threat of parallel trade becomes binding and the economy
switches from a full trade to a partical trade equilibrium are straighforward. In a full trade
equilibrium, relative prices equal relative per capita incomes pP /pR = !LP /LR. In that case,
di↵erences in willingnesses to pay must be small enough,  P / R  ⌧ , so that the threat of
parallel trade is not binding. In constrast, when di↵erences in willingnesses to pay become
large,  P / R > ⌧ , the parallel trade constraint kicks in. This happens when
!LP
LR
> ⌧ 1. (7)
In other words, a full trade equilibrium emerges when per capita incomes are similar, while an
arbitrage equilibrium emerges when the gap in per capita incomes is large.
Up to now we have implicitely assumed that trade costs are su ciently low so that the
two countries will engage in trade. The following proposition proves existence of a general
equilibrium with trade.
Proposition 5 When ⌧  ⌧⇤ ⌘ paF/PR + 1, the two countries will trade with each other
for all LP /LR 2 (0, 1].
PROOF. See Appendix C.
The trade condition in the proposition makes sure prices in country P are su ciently high to
induce country-R firms to export their product. Notice that, with ⌧  ⌧⇤, country-P firms are
also willing to export since they can charge a price pRT > p
P < ⌧/a. The trade condition is
quite intuitive. Trade is more valuable when fixed costs are high, as these costs are spread out
over a larger market. For the same reason, trade is more valuable if the local market is small.
Hence the critical value of iceberg costs ⌧⇤ is increasing in F and falling in PR. Notice also that
the trade condition makes a statement about the relative size of trade costs and the square
root of the mark-up. One could argue that empirically observed mark-ups are often lower than
observed trade costs, thus contradicting the trade condition. Notice, however, that aF/PR+1
is the mark-up of a (northern) firm that sells its product exclusively on the home market,
while the average mark-up in the economy is a weighted average of these non-exporting firms
(with high mark-ups) and exporting firms (with low mark-ups). Hence, our simple model can
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accommodate a situation where there is trade, even though the economy-wide mark-up falls
short of trade costs.
Figure 2 shows the relevant equilibria in (LP /LR, ⌧) space. There is full trade in region F
which emerges at high values of LP /LR and intermediate values of ⌧ . An arbitrage equilibrium
prevails in region A which arises at low trade costs and high income di↵erences. Figure 2 also
shows what happens when population size in the poor country increases. In that case, the
downward-sloping branch that separates regions F and A shifts to the left. When the poor
country is larger, ⌧⇤ is una↵ected and there are more parameter constellations (LP /LR, ⌧)
under which a full trade equilibrium emerges. In this sense, a larger population in the poor
country fosters trade.15
Figure 2
Figure 3 shows the welfare responses of changes in ⌧ across the various regimes graphi-
cally. Panel a) is drawn for relatively low per capita income di↵erences !LP /LR > ⌧⇤. In
that case, an arbitrage equilibrium emerges with low trade costs, while a full trade equilibrium
emerges with moderate trade costs. Panel b) is drawn for higher per capita income di↵erences
!LP /LR  ⌧⇤ so that a full trade equilibrium is not feasible. Country-R welfare (the bold
graph) is monotonically decreasing in ⌧ in both panels of Figure 3. Hence the R-consumer
reaches his maximum welfare when trade costs are at their lowest possible level ⌧ = 1. In
contrast, the impact of ⌧ on country-P welfare (the dotted graph) interacts with per capita
income di↵erences. When these di↵erences are low (panel a), country-P welfare increases in
⌧ when ⌧ <
 
!LP /LR
  1
and decreases in ⌧ when ⌧    !LP /LR  1. Welfare is maximized
at ⌧ =
 
!LP /LR
  1
(when the equilibrium switches from a full-trade to an arbitrage equilib-
rium). When per capita income di↵erences are large (panel b), country-P welfare decreases
monotonically in ⌧ (full trade is not feasible) and welfare is maximized at ⌧ = ⌧⇤.
Figure 3
4 Many rich and poor countries
In an arbitrage equilibrium with two countries, all firms in the poor country are exporters
while only a subset of firms in the rich country exports. Moreover, a trade liberalization
that relaxes the arbitrage constraint always hurts poor consumers. We now show that these
predictions need to be qualified in a multi-country world. The e↵ect of moving from two to
many countries can be most easily shown when there are n identical rich countries and m
identical poor countries, i.e. a world with a fragmented rich North and a fragmented poor
South. As before, we assume that countries di↵er in per capita endowments (and population
size) but are identical in all other respects.
15Notice that there is international trade even when income di↵erences become extremely large and LP /LR
becomes very small. The range of traded goods approaches zero, however, when LP /LR goes to zero.
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The general equilibrium has a structure very similar to that of the two-country case. From
the zero-profit conditions for internationally active firms, it is straightforward to show that
relative wages are now given by
! ⌘ W
R
WP
=
aF + ⌧P R + PR
aF + ⌧P P + PP ,
where P R = (n 1)PR+mPP and P P = nPR+(m 1)PP are rest-of-the-world populations
from the perspective of country R and country P , respectively. In full world trade equilibrium,
relative prices of southern relative to northern markets are determined by relative per capita
incomes, pP /pR = !LP /LR, and the ratio of produced varieties still reflects di↵erences in
aggregate GDP, NP /NR = !LPPP /LRPR.
The interesting case is when income di↵erences su ciently large, so that !LP /LR > ⌧ 1.
In that case, the arbitrage constraint is binding, limiting trade between the rich North and
the poor South. A northern firm now has two options: either export worldwide or export only
to other northern countries. Notice that, unlike in the two-country case, all northern firms
are now exporters. Firms that export exclusively to the North have a smaller market but can
charge higher prices. Firms that export to all countries worldwide set low prices but have the
large world market. While large di↵erences in per capita incomes limit trade across regions,
there is full trade within regions. As there are no income di↵erences within a region, all goods
produced in that region are also sold to other countries in that region.
The arbitrage equilibrium can now be solved in a straightforward way (for details see
Appendix E). We first study how di↵erences in per capita incomes and population sizes a↵ect
trade intensity. It is straightforward to calculate
  = 2
m!LPPP
nLRPR +m!LPPP
(m  1)PP + ⌧PR
mPP + n⌧PR + 2
(n  1)LRPR
nLRPR +m!LPPP .
which readily reduces to the expression derived in the last section when n = m = 1. An increase
in LP increases world trade intensity (and reduces North-North trade with exclusive goods). It
can also be shown that a larger population in the South has a weaker e↵ect on trade intensity
than a larger per capita income. Hence with respect to per capita incomes and populations
sizes, the results of the two-country case carry over to the multi-country framework.
In contrast to the two-country case, the e↵ect of a trade liberalization on welfare is now
ambiguous. There are two e↵ects. On the one hand, a lower ⌧ implies a tighter arbitrage
constraint for globally active producers. Lower prices for globally traded products (relative to
products exclusively sold in the North) induce former northern world-market producers to con-
centrate their sales on northern markets only. This reduces trade intensity between the North
and the South. On the other hand, a reduction in ⌧ stimulates trade within regions. While
South-South trade increases less than North-South trade falls (first term of above equation
increases in ⌧), North-North trade unambiguously increases (second term decreases in ⌧). A
trade liberalization is more likely to stimulate trade if there are more countries with a region.
Within-regional trade is more strongly a↵ected in this case and dominates the reduction in
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North-South trade. A trade liberalization is also more likely to stimulate North-South trade,
the larger is the North relative to the South. In that case, North-North trade (which is pos-
itively a↵ected) comprises the bulk of world trade. When the North is much larger than the
South, positive e↵ects on North-North trade of a trade liberalization dominate negative e↵ects
on North-South trade flows.
It turns out that the welfare level of a country-P household is given by
UP = mNP + nNRN =
aLP (mPP + ⌧nPR)
aF + ⌧P P + PP .
It is straightforward to see that @UP /@⌧ < 0 if aF < (m   1)PP (1 + (m/n) (PP /PR)). This
means that a trade liberalization may raise welfare in country P and is more likely to do so the
higher ismPP . A reduction in ⌧ has two opposing e↵ects. The arbitrage channel is still at work
and induces northern firms to abstain from selling to southern households. This is harmful for
southern welfare. However, a lower ⌧ stimlates South-South trade, which has a beneficial e↵ect
on southern welfare. Households in the poor country gain from a trade liberalization when
there are many poor countries and when poor countries are large. In such a situation, there is
a lot to gain from South-South trade because there are many trade barriers and because the
southern markets are large.
We summarize the above discussion in the following
Proposition 6 Assume there are m identical poor countries and n identical rich countries,
with LP /LR < (!⌧) 1. a) All northern firms export, but some of them export only to other
northern countries; b) A trade liberalization (a lower ⌧) unambiguously increases welfare of rich
households. It increases welfare of poor households if aF < (m   1)PP (1 + (m/n) (PP /PR))
and decreases it otherwise. The increase in welfare is larger in the North than in the South.
Proof. In text.
Notice that the multi-country model generates an empirically testable hypothesis. The
model predicts a positive correlation between the export probability of a northern firm and
the per-capita income of a potential destination. In our simple model, the probability that a
firm from a rich country exports to another rich country is 100 percent. (The prediction that
100 percent of all firms export is clearly an artefact arising from the assumed absence of firm
heterogeneity.) In contrast, the probability that a nothern firms exports to a poor country is
less than 100 percent and is lower the poorer a potential destination. Below, we will test this
prediction by investigating whether and to wich extent US export probabilities of HS6-digit
product categories are indeed positively related to potential destinations’ per capita incomes.
5 General preferences
The assumption of 0-1 preferences yields a tractable framework with closed-form solutions.
However, the focus is entirely on the extensive margin of consumption. This contrasts with
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the standard CES case where all adjustments happen along the intensive margin. We go beyond
these two polar cases in this section by studying general preferences. We show that the qual-
itative characteristics of the equilibria under 0-1 preferences carry over to general preferences
featuring non-trivial intensive and extensive margins of consumption. In particular, we pre-
cisely define the conditions under which an arbitrage equilibrium with non-traded goods exists
and also provide a simple calibration exercise showing that arbitrage equilibria emerge under
reasonable parameter values and that there is a quantitatively strong relationship between per
capita incomes on the extensive margin of trade.
5.1 Utility and prices
Let us go back to the setup of Section 5 with two countries that di↵er in per capita income
and population size. However, let household welfare take the general form
U =
ˆ 1
0
v(c(j))dj,
where c(j) denotes the consumed quantity of good j. It is assumed that the subutility v()
satisfies v0 > 0, v00 < 0 and v(0) = 0. Beyond these standard assumptions, we make two further
assumptions on the function v(): (i) v0(0) < 1, (ii) v00(0) >  1, and (iii)  v0(c)/[v00(c)c] is
decreasing in c. The first assumption implies that reservation prices are finite, generating a
non-trivial extensive margin of consumption; the second ensures that an arbitrage equilibrium
exists when per capita income di↵erences are su ciently high (see below); and the third implies
a price elasticity of demand decreasing along the demand curve. Monopolistic pricing leads
to p = (1 + v00(c)c/v0(c)) 1b, where b denotes marginal cost. To simplify notation, we denote
the mark-up by µ(c) ⌘ (1 + v00(c)c/v0(c)) 1. Assumptions (i)-(iii) imply that µ(0) = 1 and
µ0(c) > 0.16
How does firms’ price setting behavior change when there are consumer responses along
the intensive margin? With 0-1 preferences, the monopoly price equals the representative
household’s willingness to pay and does not depend on marginal production costs. With general
preferences, however, firms solve the standard profit maximization problem: the price equals
marginal costs times a mark-up that depends on the price elasticity of demand. This implies
an important di↵erence to the case of 0-1 preferences. With general preferences, there are
price di↵erences between imported and domestically produced goods. While symmetric utility
implies that importers and local producers within a given location face the same demand
curve, marginal costs di↵er since importers have to bear transportionation costs and since
wages vary by location. To allow for such di↵erences, we denote by pij , c
i
j and b
i
j , respectively,
the price, quantity and marginal cost of a good produced in country j and consumed in country
i. Unconstrained monopoly pricing implies pij = µ(c
i
j)b
i
j .
16µ0(c) > 0 follows directly from assumption (iii). To see why µ(0) = 1 we use l’Hopital’s rule
limc!0 v0(c)c/v(c) = limc!0 (1 + v00(c)c/v0(c)). However, limc!0 v0(c)c/v(c) = v0(0) · limc!0 c/v(c) =
v0(0)/v0(0) = 1. This implies limc!0 v00(c)c/v0(c) = 0 and hence limc!0 µ(c) = 1. Since the monopolist op-
timally chooses a price along the elastic part of the demand curve, no further restrictions on the µ(c)-function
are needed.
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5.2 The arbitrage equilibrium
The arbitrage equilibrium features a situation in which (i) only a subset of country-R pro-
ducers sell their product worldwide at su ciently low prices to avoid arbitrage; (ii) the re-
maining country-R firms sell their product exclusively in the rich country at the unconstrained
monopoly price; (iii) all poor-country producers export their products, also at prices that avoid
arbitrage. The discussion in this section focuses on the conditions under which an arbitrage
equilibrium exists. (Appendix E provides the full system of equations that characterize such
an equilibrium.)
The arbitrage constraints for country-R and country-P producers, respectively, are now
given by
1/⌧  pRR/pPR  ⌧ and 1/⌧  pPP /pRP  ⌧.
A necessary condition for the existence of an arbitrage equilibrium is that these constraints
are binding, so that pRR/p
P
R = p
R
P /p
P
P = ⌧ . This happens to be the case if the gap in per
capita incomes becomes su ciently large. As LR/LP , and hence cRR/c
P
R, get large the ratio of
(unconstrained) monopoly prices eventually exceeds trade costs, or µ(cRR)/µ(c
P
R) > ⌧
2. (Recall
that µ0(c) > 0.) Notice, however, that a binding arbitrage constraint does not necessarily imply
that there are non-traded goods. The reason is that adjustment now does not only occur at
the extensive margin but also at the intensive margin. Hence there are full trade equilibria
where the arbitrage constraint binds.
To verify the existence of an arbitrage equilibrium with non-traded goods, we look at
incentives of country-R firms to sell exclusively on the home market rather than selling their
products worldwide. A country-R producer’s profit is given by (to ease notation we write
pRR ⌘ ⌧p and pPR ⌘ p)
⇡ = PR (⌧p  1/a) cRR + PP (p  ⌧/a) cPR.
The corresponding demand curves are given by the first order conditions v0(cRR) =  
R⌧p
and v0(cPR) =  
P p for households in country-R and and country-P , respectively. This yields
dcRR/dp = (1/p)v
0(cRR)/v
00(cRR) and dc
P
R/dp = (1/p)v
0(cPR)/v
00(cPR). The first order condition of
the monopolistic firm’s price setting choice is given by
⌧p  1/a
p
✓
  v
0(cRR)
v00(cRR)
◆
+
p  ⌧/a
p
✓
  v
0(cPR)
v00(cPR)
◆ PP
PR = ⌧c
R
R + c
P
R
PP
PR .
To examine whether an arbitrage equilibrium exists, let LP and therefore cPR approach zero,
all other exogenous variables (including PP /PR) remain fixed. The first order condition then
becomes
⌧p  1/a
⌧p
✓
  v
0(cRR)
v00(cRR)c
R
R
◆
+
p  ⌧/a
⌧pcRR
 
  lim
cPR!0
v0(cPR)
v00(cPR)
!
PP
PR = 1.
Now consider the optimal decision of a country-R firm whether to produce exclusively for the
home market. Denoting by pN and cNR price and quantity of non-traded goods, the first order
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condition for exclusive producers is
pN   1/a
pN
✓
  v
0(cNR )
v00(cNR )c
N
R
◆
= 1.
When ⌧ is su ciently low, so that p > ⌧/a, comparing the last two equations shows that the
price of a non-exporting firm pN is strictly larger than the price of an exporting firm ⌧p. (This
is because, by assumption,  v0(0)/v00(0) > 0.) Since cPR ! 0 when LP ! 0, export revenues
are zero. Hence non-exporters charge higher prices and their profits are larger than those of
exporters. This implies that an outcome where all firms export cannot be an equilibrium. We
summarize our discussion in
Proposition 7 There is a critical income gap   such that, for all LP /LR <  , an equilibrium
emerges in which only a subset of goods is traded.
Proof. In text.
The above proposition implicitely assumes an equilibrium where the two countries trade
with each other. This is not a priori clear because the countries may also remain in autarky.
The following proposition shows that transportation costs need to fall short of a certain limit
to make sure that trade will take place in equilibrium.
Proposition 8 Denote by cRa consumption per variety under autarky in the rich country.
There will be trade in equilibrium, if ⌧ < µ(cRa )v
0(0)/v0(cRa ) where aF/PR = cRa (µ(cRa )  1).
Proof. See Appendix F.
An important result we derived under 0-1 preferences holds that population size has a
weaker e↵ect than per capita incomes in determining trade patterns. We now demonstrate
that this is also true with general preferences. The previous proposition showed that, starting
from a full trade equilibrium, increasing the gap in per capita incomes will eventually generate
an arbitrage equilibrium with non-traded goods. We now show this is not necessarily the case,
when we increase relative population size.
To make this point, we proceed as follows. We first observe that, starting from a full trade
equilibrium, an increase in LP /LR beyond unity eventually leads to a “reversed” arbitrage
equilibrium, in which some country-P producers sell only on the domestic market while all
country-R producers export. We now show that such a reversed arbitrage equilibrium cannot
emerge from a successive increase in PP /PR (keeping LP /LR < 1 constant), because this does
not generate price di↵erences su ciently large to escape a full trade equilibrium. In other
words, increasing PP /PR, we cannot reach a situation where both arbitrage constraints are
violated, µ(cPR)   µ(cRR) and µ(cPP )   µ(cRP )⌧2. To see this, consider the households’ budget
constraints
aLR = NPµ(c
R
P )c
R
P ⌧! +NRµ(c
R
R)c
R
R
aLP = NPµ(c
P
P )c
P
P +NRµ(c
P
R)c
P
R⌧/!,
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and take the di↵erence between the two equations. If both arbitrage conditions are violated,
the budget constraints can only hold if ! > ⌧ . However, if ! > ⌧ the zero-profit condition is
violated in at least one country in a full trade equilibrium (where firms charge the unconstrained
monopoly price). In such an equilibrium, the zero-profit condition in country j is given by
PRcRj (µ(cRj )  1)/a+ PP cPj (µ(cPj )  1)⌧/a = F,
where piP > p
i
R and c
i
P < c
i
R, since country P has higher marginal cost than country R, both
on the domestic and the export market. However, this implies ciP (µ(c
i
P )  1) < ciR(µ(ciR)  1)
for both i = P and i = R, i.e. country R-producers make strictly larger profits on both
markets. It follows that, when the zero-profit condition holds in country R, it must be violated
in country P , and vice versa, if country P is the low-wage country. In the latter case, we
must have ! > 1/⌧ to ensure that both zero-profit conditions can hold simultaneously. Hence
we have ! 2 (1/⌧, ⌧) in a full trade equilibrium with unconstrained price setting. In sum,
we always have ! < ⌧ in a full trade equilibrium. But this implies that households’ budget
constraints continue to hold simultaneously when PP /PR gets very large. Thus, unlike a
successive increase in LP /LR (beyond unity), it is not possible to reach a “reversed” arbitrage
equilibrium with a successive increase in PP /PR . In this sense, the di↵erence in population
sizes has a weaker e↵ect on trade patterns than the di↵erence in per capita endowments. We
summarize our discussion in the following
Proposition 9 Per capita endowments are more important for trade patterns than popula-
tion sizes. Starting from a full trade equilibrium with unconstrained price setting, successive
increases in LP /LR (beyond unity) lead to a “reversed” arbitrage equilibrium, while successive
increases in PP /PR cannot generate a reversed arbitrage equilibrium.
Proof. In text.
6 Empirical evidence
In this section we assess whether our model leads to quantiative predictions consistent with
empirical facts in disaggregated trade data. We proceed in three steps. First, we test the
prediction (developed at the end of section 4) of a positive relationship between a rich country’s
export probability and a destination’s per capita income, looking at US export data for 1,263
HS6-digit product categories to 135 potential export destinations. Second, we use the model
developed in section 5 and undertake a calibration exercise to study whether our framework
can match (i) the US export probability to a “typical” poor country and (ii) the gradient of
the US export probability with respect to destinations’ per capita incomes. Finally, we provide
a discussion contrasting the model’s predictions with the empirical evidence.
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6.1 Evidence from disaggregated trade data
We analyze the following baseline regression
D(i, k) = ↵0 + ↵1 lnGDP (k) + ↵2 ln y(k) +X(i, k)  +  (i) + e(i, k),
where D(i, k) indicates whether the US exports product i to country k, GDP (k) is aggregate
GDP of country k, and y(k) denotes per capita income of country k. X(i, k) is a vector of
controls,17  (i) is a product-fixed e↵ect, and e(i, k) is an error term.
We use UN Comtrade data complied by Gaulier and Zignago (2010) containing yearly
unidirected bilateral trade flows at the 6-digit-level of the Harmonized System (1992) for the
year 2007. We observe 5,018 product categories at the 6-digit level. We look only at consumer
goods (according the BEC classification). This leaves us with 1,263 product categories from
which we exclude those 11 categories the US did not export in 2007. Our data set includes
135 potential export destinations. Information on per capita incomes (2005 PPP-adjusted
USD) and population sizes are taken from Heston et al. (2006). We exclude all bilateral trade
flows with negative quantities and set D(i, k) = 0 when the observed quantity falls short of
USD 2,000. We end up with 169,020 potential export flows (1,252 products ⇥ 135 potential
importers). 39.1 percent of these potential export flows actually materialized in 2007.
Empirical results. A crucial prediction of our model is ↵2 > 0: a destination’s per capita
income is a significant determinant for the export probability, conditional on the destiantion’s
aggregate GDP. In the standard homothetic model we should have ↵2 = 0, since there is no
extra role for a destination’s per capita income once aggregate GDP is controlled for. The
estimates of Table 1, column 1, clearly indicate that ↵2 is positive, statistically significant,
and quantatively large: doubling a destination’s per capita income, holding its aggregate GDP
constant, increases the US export probability of a HS6 digit product category by 8.5 percentage
points. The estimates of column 1 also imply that a destination’s per capita income is more
important than its population size. To see this, denote by Pop(k) destination k’s population
size, so that lnPop(k) = lnGDP (k)   ln y(k). This lets us rewrite the empirical model as
D(i, k) = ↵0+(↵1+↵2) ln y(k)+↵1 lnPop(k)+... Hence doubling the per capita income (holding
population size constant) increases the export probability by 14.9 (= 8.5 + 6.4) percentage
points, while doubling population size (holding per capita income constant) increases it by
only 6.4 percentage points. We conclude that the empirical evidence is consistent with the
predictions of our model, according to which per capita income play a more important role
than populations size to explain the extensive margin of international trade (see Propositions
3 and 9).
Table 1
17Control variables include: log of distance between exporter’s and importer’s capital, dummy for a common
border, dummy for importer being an island, dummy for importer being landlocked, dummy for importer and
exporter ever having had colonial ties, dummy for currency union between importer and exporter, dummy for
importer and exporter sharing a common legal system, dummy for religious similarity, dummy for importer and
exporter having a free trade agreement, and dummy for importer and exporter sharing a common language.
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To check the robustness of our estimates, columns 2-6 of Table 1 replace the regressor ln y(k)
by a set of dummy variables to allow for a more flexible impact of per capita incomes on export
probabilities.18 In column 2, we use the same sample as in the log specification of column 1;
column 3 excludes very small destination (with population size less than 1 million); and column
4 and 5 aggregate export proabilities to HS4 and HS2 digit levels, respectively. Results indicate
a monotonic impact of per capita income, which is robust across specifications.19
Explaining the evidence with previous approaches. We first note that the per capita
income e↵ect of Table 1 cannot be explained by standard heterogeneous-firm models a` la Melitz
(2003). Because of CES preferences, there is no extra role for a destination’s per capita income
once the destination’s aggregate GDP is controlled for. In this sense, our model is able to
explain an empirical fact that cannot be explained by standard heterogeneous firm models.
In principle, standard models could accomodate the results by assuming that market-entry
costs are decreasing in destinations’ per capita incomes. However, such an assumption is ad
hoc and influential recent work by Arkolakis (2010) argues in the opposite direction. In the
Arkolakis model, market entry (i.e. advertising) costs decrease in population size. Holding
aggregate GDP constant, this implies a positive relationship between market entry costs and
the destination’s per capita income.
Moreover, simple specifications of non-homothetic preferences frequently used in the liter-
ature (e.g. Markusen 1986, Bergstrand 1990, Mitra/Trindade 2005) can also not account for
the per capita income e↵ects of Table 1. In these specifications, a CES-index for di↵erentiated
products is linked with a homogenous good, assuming the latter is a necessity and the for-
mer are luxuries.20 Such specifications of non-homotheticities generate a bang-bang solution:
as long as subsistence needs are not covered, consumers’ willingness to pay for di↵erentiated
products – the “reservation price” – is zero; when subsistence needs are covered, reservation
prices for di↵erentiated products jump to infinity and all goods are traded. This means that
further assumptions are needed to generate export zeros.
More recent approaches of non-homothetic preferences allow for variable elasticities of sub-
stitution (VES). In such specifications, non-negativity constraints may become binding as
reservation prices may become finite. Simonovska (2012), Markusen (2012), Behrens and Mu-
rata (2012a,b), Saure´ (2012), and Mrazova and Neary (2013) provide such models. In these
18The estimated model is D(i, k) = ↵˜0+ ↵˜1 lnGDP (k)+
P6
n=1 ↵˜2nDy(k, n)+X(i, k) ˜+  ˜(i)+ e˜(i, k), where
Dy(k, n) indicates whether of not destination k falls into per capita income category n. We classify countries
into 7 per capita income groups: (i) lower than USD 1000; (ii) USD 1000-1999; (iii) USD 2000-3999; (iv) USD
4000-7999; (v) USD 8000-15999; (vi) USD 16000-31999; and (vii) USD 32000 or larger. The group with per
capita income larger than USD 32,000 serves as the reference group.
19In Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix, we provide further robustness checks. In Table A1, we show that the
US results for 2007 shown in Table 1 are very similar in each single year since 1997. In Table A2 we look at the
14 largest consumer goods exporters (rather than only the US). For all these large exporting countries we find
a significant e↵ect of destinations’ per capita income, holding destinations’ GDP constant (the only exception
being Mexico where the e↵ect is barely significant and quantitatively small). These results are also in line with
the evidence in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Bernasconi and Wuergler (2012) where, respectively, output
per worker and income per capita are included as control variables in extensive margin regressions.
20A frequently adpoted functional form with the property is ↵ log (x  x¯)+(1 ↵) logC where x is the quantity
of the homogenous good, x¯ is the subsistence level, and C is a CES aggregator for di↵erentiated products.
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papers, export zeros emerge under supply heterogeneities, when a destination’s reservation
price falls short of the marginal (production plus transportation) costs of serving that market.
Notice, however, that the above papers do not consider arbitrage. Clearly, the empirical evi-
dence in Table 1 cannot discriminate between export zeros arising from the reservation price
falling short of the marginal production costs and export zeros arising from international arbi-
trage. To explore the quantitative relevance of the arbitrage channel further, we now provide
a simple calibration exercise.
6.2 Calibrating the model
The aim of this section is to investigate the quantitative relevance of arbitrage constraints
predicted by our model. To check whether and which extent arbitrage constraints can account
for the empirically observed positive relationship between export probabilities and per capita
incomes, we want to match two moments of the data: (i) the US export probability to a “poor”
trading partner and (ii) the profit shares in the two countries. A poor county is defined as
country with a per capita income lower than USD 8,000. (76 out of the 135 countries used in
the above empirical analysis belong to this subsample.) Taking the coe cients of our baseline
regression in Table 1, column 2, the predicted export probability to the typical poor country is
0.326, which we try to match exactly in the calibration. Moreover, we look for parameters such
that the implied profit shares in the rich and the poor country are close to 0.333, a benchmark
frequently usually in quantitative applications.21
The starting point of our calibration is the model developed in section 5. We assume
that the subutility v(c) belongs to the HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) class, which
takes the form v0(c) = (s   c )1/ . Imposing the restriction s > 0 implies v0(0) = s1/  < 1;
v00(0) =  v0(0)/s >  1; and  v0(c)/[v00(c)c] = s/c     is decreasing in c. This satisfies our
initial assumptions on the form of v(c) adopted in section 5. This specification encompasses
the Stone-Geary for   =  1, the quadratic utility for   = 1, and the 0-1 utility when   !1.
For our calibration exercise we make the further parameter restriction s =   (which precludes
the Stone-Geary).
To match the income of the average trade partner we need to measure real income. Relative
real incomes cannot be simply calculated by taking the ratio of nominal incomes. With non-
homothetic preferences, the rich and poor country have di↵erent price indices. To be as close
as possible to a calibration exercise with CES preferences, we need to transform the utility
indices UP and UR such that the index is homogenous of degree one in quantities. We define
the ratio of real per capita incomes as yP /yR = v 1(UP )/v 1(UR).22
21Notice that the target of our calibration exercise is the profit share rather than the markup. The reason
is that, in our model, there is no intermediate sector. Hence it is more reasonable to focus on the profit
share so that the implied price-cost ratio is a “gross” markup. Obviously, profit share and markup are closely
related. For instance, in the autarky equilibrium with 0-1 preferences, aggregate income is PL, while profits are
FN = aFL/(aF/P + 1). The profit share reads therefore (aF/P) /(aF/P + 1), while the gross markup equals
µ = aF/P + 1. Thus, a profit share of 1/3 corresponds to the gross markup of 1/2.
22The functional form of v(·) has a bliss point, which implies that the value of the argument in v 1(·) could
exceed v(s/ ) = v(1), the utility at the bliss point. To avoid this, we need to normalize welfare levels such that
the adjusted ratio of real per capita incomes is yP /yR = v
 1(kUP )/v 1(kUR), where k is a normalization factor.
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We now turn to the calibration exercise. The simulations show that the results depend on
the ratio aF/PRLR. Hence, we can normalize PR = LR = F = 1 and vary a. This leaves us
with five parameters: the productivity parameter a, the preference parameter  , population
PP and per capita endowment LP of the poor country, and trade costs ⌧ . Since we want to
match the extensive margin of trade with typical poor US trading partner, PP and LP are
determined by the ratio of per capita GDP yP /yR, which equals 0.083. This ratio pins down
the labor endowment LP using the above formula for yP /yR. The ratio of aggregate GDP
PP yP /PRyR determines PP (recall that PR was set to unity). In 2007, the (unweighted)
aggreate GDP of trading partners with per capita income below 8,000 USD was equal to 287
billion USD, whereas aggregate GDP of the US was equal to 13,027 billion USD. Finally, trade
costs are set to 1.2, which is somewhat larger than 1.1 chosen for missing country pairs in the
standard DOTS IMF database.23
We are left with our free choice parameters a and  .We set a = 0.475 and   = 50. We chose
a high value of   to come close to the 0-1 specification. Under this parameter constellation the
model predicts an export probability of 0.328, which matches exactly the US export probability
to the average poor destination observed in the data. The calibrated profit shares for the rich
and poor country equal 0.328 and 0.262, respectively which are not too far o↵ the benchmark
of 0.333. (Clearly, when   is varied, we need to adjust a to match the extensive trade margin
exactly.) We conclude that our model can match the observed US export probability to a
typical poor destination under reasonable parameter values.24
Figure 4
We can take our simple calibration exercise one step further by matching not only the US
export probability to a typical poor destination, but also its gradient with respect destinations’
per capita incomes. Figure 4 constrasts the predictions of the model to the per capita income
e↵ects estimated in the regression in Table 1, column 2 (holding all characteristics other than
per capita income indicators constant, at the sample means of countries poorer than USD
8,000). Figure 4 reveals that the model predicts a very steep gradient: the export probability
is 0.030 to destinations with a per capita income below USD 1,000 (class mean USD 750);
0.527 to destinations with incomes between USD 4,000 and 8,000 (class mean 6,000); and more
than 90 percent to destinations with a per capita income above USD 8,000. In contrast, the
(It turns out that alternative values of k have only a very small e↵ect on the calibration outcomes.) Note also,
that a similar normalization would not change the results in the CES case, since v 1(·) is a power function. In
that case, v 1(a)/v 1(b) = v 1(a/b), and we have v 1(kUP )/v 1(kUR) = v 1(UP /UR). In other words, the
correction parameter k is irrelevant in the case of homothetic preferences.
23Estimates of trade costs vary according to the particular definition. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
argue that trade costs (broadly defined) are large. In the context of parallel trade, where an arbitrageur exploits
price di↵erentials for an existing product, the relevant trade costs should be defined more narrowly, consisting
mainly tari↵s and direct transport costs. Hummels (2007) reports 4 percent of ad valorem transport costs for
US imports and 7 percent for New Zealand. Including tari↵s and accounting for higher transport costs with
poor countries, it seems reasonable to set trade costs at a somewhat higher level in the calibration.
24Alternative combinations of   and a that match the export probability to the typical poor country of 0.328
exactly, and lead to a very similar gradient as in Figure 4 below. However, for lower values of  , the implied
profits share become unrealistically large.
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gradient of export probabilities observed in the data is much flatter. It ranges from an export
probability of 0.268 for destinations with incomes below USD 1,000; 0.416 to destination with
incomes between 4,000 and 8,000; and 0.533 for destinations with incomes above 8,000.
6.3 Discussion
While our model can match the US export probability to a typical poor destination, it predicts
a gradient substantially steeper than the one observed in the data. We argue that there are
two main reasons for this discrepancy.
First, the model assumes perfect symmetry across products and identical households within
each country. In reality, of course, asymmetries are pervasive: firms di↵er in productivity and
households are unequally rich (or have di↵erent tastes). Arguably, introducing asymmetries
would generate a flatter gradient. Figure 4 reveals that our model overestimates the US export
probability to other rich destinations. The model predicts an export probability of unity, while
the regression analysis reveals a US HS6-digit export probability to other rich countries which
is substantially lower. The model prediction is clearly an artefact of the assumption that firms
work with identical technologies. Once we allow for productivity di↵erences, firms with too
high costs who will have to abstain from exporting to other rich destinations. This generates
an export probability below 1, bringing the prediction of the model closer to the data.25
On the other hand, the model underestimates the export probabilities to low-income coun-
tries. This is most easy to see when the poor country consists of wealthy and less wealthy
households. In that case, firms of the rich country have a higher incentive to export, since
there is the additional option to charge somewhat higher prices and sell to wealthy consumers
in the export destination. This softens the arbitrage constraint and leads to higher export
probabilities to poor destinations, thus bringing the predictions of the model closer to the
data. A similar outcome may arise from heterogeneities on the supply side. There will be price
di↵erences across products which let consumers in a poor destination purchase only the low-
priced goods. This relaxes their budget constraint, allowing them to spread out expenditures
over a larger set of imported products.
In sum, introducing relevant demand and supply heterogeneities arguably decreases (in-
crease) the export probability of rich-country firms to rich (poor) destinations. While the
model predicts a too steep gradient of export probabilities with respect to destinations’ per
capita incomes, we argue that our calibraton exercise is consistent with the idea that arbitrage
is important. Suppose, to the contrary, that the model had predicted a too weak e↵ect of
per capita incomes on export probabilities. Since adding relevant heterogeneities would have
made the gradient even flatter, the model predictions would have been even more at odds with
the data, leading to the conclusion that arbitrage is of limited relevance. While allowing for
heterogeneous firms and consumers is beyond the scope of this paper, we conclude that our
25Notice that this argument does not rely on fixed export costs. To see this, consider a firm that can charge
the same price in the home and in the export market (because consumers in both countries have identical
willingnesses to pay). Such a firm may break even in the home market but not in the export market when the
price is high enough to cover the marginal cost of production but too low to cover also the transportation costs.
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calibration exercise points to the potential importance of arbitrage for explaining the extensive
margin of international trade.
A second reason for the di↵erence between the model’s predictions and the observed data
may be due to aggregation bias. In the model, the export probability refers to a single product,
while in the empirical analysis the export probability refers to a product group (HS6 digit).
Aggregation may increase measured export probabilitie, because it su ces to have positive
exports of one single product, to measure positive exports for a HS6 product category. If per
capita income e↵ects materialize mainly within (rather than between) HS6 product categories,
export probabilities will be strongly overestimated for poor countries, while less so in richer
countries. Getting rid of the aggregation bias would therefore generate lower export probabil-
ities to poor destinations and a steeper gradient in export probabilities, bringing the gradient
of the empirical estimates closer to the one predicted by the model.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies a model of international trade in which an importer’s per capita income
is a primary determinant of export zeros. This is due to a demand e↵ect: consumers in poor
countries have lower willingnesses to pay for di↵erentiated products than consumers in rich
countries. As a result, northern firms have a low incentive to export to a southern destination.
Our model generates export zeros from non-homothetic preferences and does not rely on firm
heterogeneity and/or fixed export-market entry costs. Hence our analysis is complementary to
standard heterogeneous-firm approaches which focus on the supply side.
A key insight of our analysis is that export zeros arise from a threat of international
arbitrage. Globally active firms cannot simultaneously set low prices in the South and high
prices in the North because this triggers arbitrage opportunities. Northern firms have two
options to avoid arbitrage: (i) set a su ciently low price in the North; or (ii) abstain from
exporting to the South. These two options involve a trade-o↵ between market size and price:
firms that export globally have a large market but need to charge a low price; firms that
sell exclusively to northern markets can charge a high price but have a smaller market. The
equilibrium of our model is characterized by Linder-e↵ects, a situation where similarity in
per capita incomes increases trade intensity between two countries. The model also generates
interesting welfare e↵ects. While rich countries always gain from a trade liberalization, poor
countries may lose. Lower trade costs tighten the arbitrage constraint and this induces northern
firms not to export to poor destinations, thus reducing the menu of supplied goods and harming
welfare of households in the South.
The patterns of trade predicted by our model are qualitatively in line with empirical ev-
idence from disaggregate US trade data. We document that the US export probability of a
HS6-digit product to a particular destination decreases significantly in that destination’s per
capita income. This result holds after controlling for the destination’s aggregate GDP and is
very robust. To assess whether our model can match these empirical observations also quanti-
tatively, we present a calibration exercise. We show that our model can match the US export
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probability to a typical poor destination under reasonable parameter values. We also show, that
the model predicts a quantiatively strong relation between export probabilities and importers’
per capita incomes. However, the gradient predicted by the model is substantially steeper than
the one observed in the data. We argue that the model’s excess sensitivity is an artefact of
the symmetry assumption. Adding empirically relevant heterogeneities (unequally productive
firms, within-country income inequality or unequal tastes) is likely to generate a substantially
flatter gradient, thus bringing the predictions of the model closer to empirically observed data.
We conclude that the predictions of our model are consistent with the hypothesis that arbitrage
is quantitatively important.
While a full-fletched analysis of supply and demand heterogeneities is clearly beyond the
scope of this paper, extending our basic framework to account for these (empirically highly
relevant) features is an interesting direction for future research. The challenge is to appropri-
ately disentangle supply and demand e↵ects and assess their relative importance. This seems
particularly relevant for a better understanding of how the emerging markets of China and
India (and other emerging markets) and their rapidly growing per capita incomes a↵ect trade
patterns and the international division of labor.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Part b). This follows from calculating the derivatives of   with respect to LP
@ 
@LP
=
2LRPR!PP
(LRPR + !LPPP )2  
4LRPR!LPPP
(LRPR + !LPPP )3!P
P =
 
LP
✓
1  2!L
PPP
LRPR + !LPPP
◆
,
and with respect to PP
@ 
@PP =
 
⇣
1 + @!
@PP
PP
!
⌘
PP
✓
1  2!L
PPP
LRPR + !LPPP
◆
,
where @!
@PP
PP
! > 0.
Part c). A given increase in LPPP has a stronger impact on   if it comes from PP rather
than from LP if @ /@ logLP =
 
@ /@LP
 
LP < @ /@ logPP =  @ /@PP  PP . This is true
since @!
@PP
PP
! > 0.
Part d). This follows from the derivative of   with respect to ⌧
@ 
@⌧
=
 @!@⌧
!
✓
1  2!L
PPP
LRPR + !LPPP
◆
.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Part b) follows from the derivatives of   with respect to LP and PP . It is straightforward to
see that @ /@LP > 0. To calculate @ /@PP we need to take into account that ! depends on
PP
@ 
@PP =
 1
PR (⌧ + PP /PR) +
1 + @!
@PP
PP
!
PP
LRPR
LRPR + !LPPP  ,
hence an increase in PP increases trade intensity   when PP is small and vice versa.
Part c). We need to show that the volume of trade increases with PP less than proportion-
ally. The argument in the text was made without considering that PP increases !. It remains
to show that, taking account of the impact of PP on !, an increase in PP reduces per capita
imports. We sign@pPNRT /@PP = sign@log(pPNRT )/@PP < 0. Calculating pPNRT , taking logs
and the derivate with respect to PP reveals that @pPNRT /@PP < 0 if
  1
⌧PR + PP +
⌧
aF + PR + ⌧PP  
1
aF + ⌧PR + PP < 0.
Multiplying by aF + PR + ⌧PP yields
 aF + P
R + ⌧PP
⌧PR + PP +
⌧(aF + PR + ⌧PP )
aF + PR + ⌧PP  
aF + PR + ⌧PP
aF + ⌧PR + PP < 0()  p
P +
⌧   !
a
< 0,
which holds true because pP > ⌧/a.
Part d). We note that sign(@ /@⌧) = sign(@ log  /@⌧). Taking logs of the expression for  
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and the derivative with respect to ⌧ yields
sign(@ /@⌧) = sign
 
1
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  1
⌧ + PRPP
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!(⌧)
  !
0(⌧)
!(⌧)
·
!(⌧)LP
LR
!(⌧)LP
LR
+ PRPP
!
> 0,
which, using !(⌧)LP /LR < ⌧ and !
0(⌧)⌧
!(⌧) >  1, implies
sign(@ /@⌧) = sign
"✓
1 +
!0(⌧)⌧
!(⌧)
◆ 
1  ⌧
⌧ + PRPP
!#
> 0.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Part a). In an arbitrage equilibrium we have pP =
 
aF + PR + ⌧PP   /  a⌧PR + aPP   .
Country-R firms export if pP   ⌧/a or, equivalently,  aF + PR + ⌧PP    ⌧PR + PP   1   ⌧ .
Solving that latter equation for ⌧ yields the trade condition. (Notice that, if the trade condi-
tions holds for country-R firms, it also holds for country-P firms, as we have pRT = ⌧p
P > pP .)
Part b). Under full trade we have pP = !LP
 
aF + PR + ⌧PP    aPRLR + a!PPLP   1  
⌧/a or
 
!LP /LR
   
aF/PR + 1    ⌧ . But since full trade occurs only when !LP /LR   1/⌧ ,
the trade condition follows.
D Two regions: n rich and m poor countries
In an arbitrage equilibrium, the price of globally traded goods is pRT = ⌧p
P in the North. Zero
profit constraints of globally traded goods are
pPmPP + ⌧pPnPR =
✓
F +
P i + ⌧P i
a
◆
W i, i = R,P.
where where P R = (n  1)PR +mPP and P P = nPR + (m  1)PP . The prices of globally
traded goods can be directly calculated pP = (aF + PR + ⌧P R)/(amPP + a⌧nPR) and
pRT = ⌧p
P . The zero profit conditions for goods exclusively traded in the North are
pRNnPR =
✓
F +
PR + ⌧(n  1)PR
a
◆
WR,
and the price of these goods follows immediately pRN =W
R(aF + PR + ⌧(n  1)PR)/(anPR).
From the zero profit conditions of globally traded goods we can calculate relative wages between
North and South
! ⌘ W
P
WR
=
aF + ⌧P R + PR
aF + PP + ⌧P P .
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The resource constraints are
LPPP = NP
✓
F +
PP + ⌧P P
a
◆
for a poor country, and
LRPR = NRT
✓
F +
PR + ⌧P R
a
◆
+NRN
✓
F +
PR + ⌧(n  1)PR
a
◆
for a rich country.
Each R-country imports all goods produced worldwide, while each P -country imports only a
subset of these goods. Hence the aggregate trade balance between the North and the South
has to be balanced in equilibrium.26 This implies
⌧NPPR = NRT PP .
From the resource constraints and the trade balance condition we get closed-form solutions for
NP , NTR , and N
R
N . This gives welfare of rich and poor households
UR (⌧) = mNP + nNRT + nN
R
N =
aLP
 
mPP + ⌧nPR 
aF + PP + ⌧P P +
a
 
LR   ⌧!LP  nPR
aF + PR + ⌧(n  1)PR ,
and
UP (⌧) = mNP + nNRT =
aLP
 
mPP + ⌧nPR 
aF + PP + ⌧P P .
We see that that @UR (⌧) /@⌧ < 0 and @US (⌧) /@⌧  0 when aF < (m 1)PP (1+mPP /(nPR)).
It also follows that @UR (⌧) /@⌧ < @US (⌧) /@⌧ , i.e. a trade liberalization benefits the rich
country more.
Finally, let us calculate trade intensity. The value of North-North trade is given by
2(n  1)  pRNNRN + pRTNRT  nPR = 2(n  1)✓LR   !⌧LP mPPmPP + ⌧nPR
◆
PR.
The value of South-South trade is
2(m  1)pPNPmPP = 2(m  1) mP
P
mPP + ⌧nPR!L
PPP
and the value of North-South trade is
2mpPNPnPR = 2m n⌧P
R
mPP + ⌧nPR!L
PPP
26Due to the symmetry of our set-up, the volume of bilateral trade is undetermined. One of the Northern
countries could produce predominantly (or exclusively) goods that are consumed only in the North, while the
other Northern country produces mainly (or exclusively) goods that are consumed worldwide. In that case,
the first Northern country runs a trade surplus with the other Northern country and a trade deficit with both
Southern countries taken together. Such trade imbalances cannot occur between the Southern countries, since
each Southern country consumes all goods the other Southern country produce, meaning that the South-South
trade flows are of the same magnitude in either direction. However, each Southern country may run a surplus
with one of the Northern countries that is balanced by a deficit with the other Northern country. Notice further
that all bilateral trade flows are equalized in a full trade equilibrium since all households in each country consume
all goods that are produced worldwide.
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This allows us to calculate trade intensity  , the value of world trade relative to world GDP
as
  = 2
(n  1)  pRNNRN + pRTNRT  nPR + (m  1)pPNPmPP +mpPNPnPR
nLRPR +m!LPPP
which, using the above formulas, can be expressed as
  = 2
m!LPPP
nLRPR +m!LPPP
✓
(m  1)PP + n⌧PR
mPP + n⌧PR
◆
+ 2
(n  1)
⇣
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⌘
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When m = 1 and n = 1 we get
  = 2
!LPPP
LRPR + !LPPP
⌧PR
⌧PR + PP .
Unlike in the arbitrage equilibrium of the two-county case, trade intensity may decrease in
⌧ . This is when a reduction in ⌧ increases South-South and North-North trade more strongly
than it reduces North-South trade.
E Equilibrium with general preferences
The arbitrage equilibrium. Here we state the full system of equations that characterize
an arbitrage equilibrium with non-traded goods. Households choose consumption levels to
maximize utility. This implies marginal rates of substitution
v0(cRR)
v0(cRP )
=
pRR
pRP
,
v0(cPR)
v0(cPP )
=
pPR
pPP
,
v0(cRR)
v0(cNR )
=
pRR
pNR
.
Firms set prices to maximize profits. Firms that sell exclusively on the home market set the
unconstrained monopoly price
pNR = µ(c
N
R )
1
a
.
Exporting firms set prices to avoid arbitrage
pRP = ⌧p
P
P , p
R
R = ⌧p
P
R.
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which leads to first-order conditions27
⌧
pPP   !/a
pPP
✓
  v
0(cRP )
v00(cRP )
◆
+
pPP   !/a
pPP
✓
  v
0(cPP )
v00(cPP )
◆ PP
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R
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P
P
PP
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◆ PP
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R
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The resource constraints are
LP = NP
 
F + PR⌧cRP /a+ PP cPP /a
 
,
LR = NTR
 
F + PRcRR/a+ PP ⌧cPR/a
 
+NNR
 
F + PRcNR /a
 
,
the trade balance condition is
pPRN
T
RPP cPR = pRPNPPRcRP ,
and the zero-profit conditions are
PP cPP
 
pPP   !/a
 
+ PRcRP
 
pRP   ⌧!/a
 
= !F.
PRcRR
 
pRR   1/a
 
+ PP cPR
 
pPR   ⌧/a
 
= F,
PRcNR
 
pNR   1/a
 
= F,
In sum, the arbitrage equilibrium has 14 equations in 14 unkowns: quantities (cPP , c
P
R, c
R
R, c
R
P , c
N
R ),
prices (pPP , p
P
R, p
R
R, p
R
P , p
N
R ), firm measures (NP , N
T
R , N
N
R ), and the relative wage !.
Full trade equilibria. As mentioned in the main text, a binding arbitrage constraint is a
neccessary though not su cient condition for an arbitrage equilibrium with non-traded goods
since consumers can now respond also along the intensive margin. There are three types of
full trade equilibria: (i) both P - and R-firms are price-constrained; (ii) P -firms are price-
constrained while R-firms set the monopoly price; and (iii) firms in both countries set the
monopoly price.28
ad (i). When both firms are price-constrained but all goods are traded, all equations are
identical except that NNR = c
N
R = 0 and p
N
R do not exist. The system reduces to 11 equations.
ad (ii). When P -firms are price constrained but R-firms are not, we have pRR = µ(c
R
R)/a
27These conditions derive from maximizing the profit functions for country-P and country-R producers, i.e.
PP cPP
 
pPP   !/a
 
+PRcRP
 
pRP   ⌧!/a
 
and PRcRR
 
pRR   1/a
 
+PP cPR
 
pPR   ⌧/a
 
, subject to the above arbitrage
constraints. Moreover, we use the fact that households’ demand functions derive from v(c) =  p which implies
@c/@p = (1/p)v0(c)/v00(c).
28Notice that the (unconstrained) price gap of country-P firms between market P and market R is higher
than the corresponding price gap for country-R firms. This is because country-P firms have low (high) costs and
low (high) demand on the home (foreign) market. This is di↵erent from the situation of country-R firms. They
have high (low) costs and low (high) demand on the foreign (home) market. This implies that country-P firms
get price-constrained first, and an equilibrium, where country-R firms are price-constrained - but country-P
firms are not - cannot exist.
39
and pPR = µ(c
P
R)⌧/a while p
R
P and p
P
P are still determined as above.
ad (iii). When firms in both countries are unconstrained, also P -firms set the monopoly
price pPP = µ(c
P
P )!/a and p
R
P = µ(c
R
P )!⌧/a.
F Proof of Proposition 7
We determine the autarky equilibrium and ask under which conditions an entrepreneur has
incentives to sell his products abroad. Setting W = 1, optimal monopolistic pricing implies
p = µ(c)/a. With free entry, profits PR(pRa   1/a)cRa must equal set up costs F
aF/PR =  µ(cRa )  1  cRa
The equilibrium is symmetric for all firms, hence the resource constraint reads
LR = NRa
 
F + PRcRa /a
 
Solving for cRa and N
R
a , we see that c
R
a does not depend on L
R. Hence when the two countries
di↵er only in Li but have equal populations, intensive consumption levels under autarky are
identical between the two countries, cRa = c
P
a . Selling one marginal unit abroad at price
v0(0)/ Pa , allows the purchase of v0(0)/( Pa pPa ) foreign goods. Since  Pa = v0(cPa )/pPa and
cRa = c
P
a this is equal to v
0(0)/v0(cRa ) > 1. Reselling this (new) product at home, yields a
price v0(0)pRa /v0(cRa ) minus trade costs. Hence, this strategy is profitable if
⇥
v0(0)pRa /v0(cRa )
⇤ ·⇥
v0(0)/v0(cRa )
⇤
> ⌧2. Expressing pRa in terms of c
R
a , we get the condition of the Proposition.
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Table 1: Extensive margin of U.S. exports, 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All Pop>1m All All
HS6 HS6 HS6 HS4 HS2
Mean dependent variable 0.391 0.391 0.399 0.576 0.731
Log importer GDP 0.064⇤⇤⇤ 0.070⇤⇤⇤ 0.089⇤⇤⇤ 0.076⇤⇤⇤ 0.061⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Log importer GDP per capita 0.085⇤⇤⇤
(0.014)
Per capita income USD 385–999 -0.265⇤⇤⇤ -0.205⇤⇤⇤ -0.270⇤⇤⇤ -0.178⇤⇤⇤
(0.064) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065)
Per capita income USD 1,000–1,999 -0.262⇤⇤⇤ -0.226⇤⇤⇤ -0.249⇤⇤⇤ -0.145⇤⇤
(0.067) (0.068) (0.071) (0.060)
Per capita income USD 2,000–3,999 -0.237⇤⇤⇤ -0.233⇤⇤⇤ -0.232⇤⇤⇤ -0.163⇤⇤⇤
(0.065) (0.063) (0.066) (0.049)
Per capita income USD 4,000–7,999 -0.116⇤ -0.146⇤⇤ -0.076 -0.035
(0.069) (0.066) (0.068) (0.047)
Per capita income USD 8,000–15,999 -0.128⇤ -0.149⇤⇤ -0.104 -0.089⇤
(0.068) (0.064) (0.067) (0.051)
Per capita income USD 16,000–31,999 -0.034 -0.030 -0.017 -0.008
(0.064) (0.061) (0.060) (0.041)
Per capita income USD 32,000– ref ref ref ref
Trade cost indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.424 0.423 0.442 0.431 0.417
N 169,020 169,020 147,736 42,255 9,045
Notes: Estimates based on a linear probability model, ?, ??, ??? denotes statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on importer level. Year is 2007. Omitted category of
income per capita groups is above USD 32,000. Trade cost indicators include log of distance between exporter’s
and importer’s capital, dummy for a common border, dummy for importer being an island, dummy for importer
being landlocked, dummy for importer and exporter ever having had colonial ties, dummy for currency union
between importer and exporter, dummy for importer and exporter sharing a common legal system, dummy for
religious similarity, dummy for importer and exporter having a free trade agreement, and dummy for importer
and exporter sharing a common language.
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Table A.1: Extensive margin of exports of the 14 largest consumer-goods exporters, 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Pop>1m All All
HS6 HS6 HS4 HS2
Mean dependent variable 0.226 0.240 0.362 0.540
Log importer GDP 0.048⇤⇤⇤ 0.055⇤⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤⇤ 0.063⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Log importer GDP per capita 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.051⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Trade cost indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.355 0.365 0.407 0.465
N 1,978,095 1,726,513 508,082 109,590
Notes: Sample is based on exports from countries with consumer goods exports larger than 50 billion USD in
2007: China, Germany, USA, France, Japan, Italy, UK, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada,
Mexiko, Switzerland, Korea. Estimates based on a linear probability model, ?, ??, ??? denotes statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered on importer
level; standard errors in brackets are clustered on the importer-exporter pair level. Sample includes all potential
export flows to countries with GDP per capita lower than the exporter under consideration. Year is 2007.
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Table A.2: Extensive margin of U.S. exports, 1997-2007
Mean of log importer GDP
Year dep. var. per capita log importer GDP Adj R2 N
coe↵. std.dev. coe↵. std.dev.
1997 0.389 0.103⇤⇤⇤ (0.016) 0.078⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.452 173,031
1998 0.387 0.102⇤⇤⇤ (0.016) 0.075⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.445 172,894
1999 0.384 0.099⇤⇤⇤ (0.014) 0.075⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.440 175,140
2000 0.386 0.094⇤⇤⇤ (0.014) 0.074⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.430 176,400
2001 0.382 0.093⇤⇤⇤ (0.015) 0.074⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.430 173,880
2002 0.373 0.087⇤⇤⇤ (0.015) 0.074⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.419 173,466
2003 0.375 0.090⇤⇤⇤ (0.014) 0.071⇤⇤⇤ (0.010) 0.420 173,742
2004 0.378 0.091⇤⇤⇤ (0.014) 0.070⇤⇤⇤ (0.010) 0.423 173,466
2005 0.391 0.091⇤⇤⇤ (0.014) 0.069⇤⇤⇤ (0.010) 0.424 173,052
2006 0.396 0.092⇤⇤⇤ (0.013) 0.067⇤⇤⇤ (0.010) 0.430 172,914
2007 0.391 0.085⇤⇤⇤ (0.014) 0.064⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.424 169,020
Notes: Estimates based on the same specification as in Table 2, column 2 above. Number of observations
vary over time because the number of countries poorer than the US and the number of HS6 consumer goods
categories exported by US firms may change over time. Estimates are from a linear probability model, ?, ??,
??? denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Controls are the same as in Table 1.
Standard errors are clustered on importer level.
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Table A.3: Extensive margin of exports of the 14 largest consumer-goods exporters, 2007
Mean of log importer GDP
Country dep. var. per capita log importer GDP Adj R2 N
coe↵. std.dev. coe↵. std.dev.
Belgium-Lux. 0.197 0.039⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.034⇤⇤⇤ (0.007) 0.414 155,067
Canada 0.126 0.042⇤⇤⇤ (0.008) 0.033⇤⇤⇤ (0.005) 0.263 154,800
China 0.370 0.060⇤⇤ (0.026) 0.068⇤⇤⇤ (0.012) 0.428 93,525
France 0.289 0.071⇤⇤⇤ (0.015) 0.045⇤⇤⇤ (0.009) 0.375 146,674
Germany 0.286 0.058⇤⇤⇤ (0.013) 0.059⇤⇤⇤ (0.007) 0.440 149,160
Italy 0.283 0.059⇤⇤⇤ (0.012) 0.056⇤⇤⇤ (0.008) 0.430 145,314
Japan 0.129 0.026⇤⇤⇤ (0.008) 0.045⇤⇤⇤ (0.006) 0.360 140,301
Korea Rp (South) 0.111 0.022⇤⇤⇤ (0.007) 0.043⇤⇤⇤ (0.005) 0.297 121,608
Mexico 0.056 0.010⇤ (0.006) 0.010⇤⇤⇤ (0.003) 0.246 101,282
Netherlands 0.228 0.052⇤⇤⇤ (0.012) 0.038⇤⇤⇤ (0.007) 0.421 153,846
Spain 0.238 0.061⇤⇤⇤ (0.012) 0.046⇤⇤⇤ (0.007) 0.397 148,346
Switzerland 0.176 0.045⇤⇤⇤ (0.009) 0.046⇤⇤⇤ (0.005) 0.401 147,506
United Kingdom 0.247 0.051⇤⇤⇤ (0.012) 0.060⇤⇤⇤ (0.007) 0.398 151,646
USA 0.391 0.085⇤⇤⇤ (0.014) 0.064⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 0.424 169,020
Notes: Includes countries with consumer goods exports larger than 50 billion USD in 2007. Estimates are
based on a linear probability model, specification is identical to the one in Table 2, column 2. ?, ??, ??? denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered on
importer level. Only potential exports flows to countries with GDP per capita lower than the exporter under
consideration are included in the sample. Controls are the same as in Table 1. Year is 2007.
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Figure 1: Demand function
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Figure 2: Full trade and arbitrage equilibrium
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Figure 4: Calibration
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Note: The figure depicts the export probability on the vertical axis and the destinations per capita income on
the horizontal axis. The graph ”Data” is based on the regression of Table 1, column 2. It depicts the estimated
export probabilities based on the coe cients of the per-capita income dummies and sets control variables to
the mean of countries with per capita income lower than USD 8,000. Per capita income levels 750, 1,500, 3,000,
6,000, 12,000, 24,000, and 48,000 refer to (class means of) per capita income categories 385-999, 1,000-1,999,
2,000-3,999, 4,000-7,999, 8,000-15,999, 16,000-31,999, and 32,000+, respectively. The graph ”Model” reports
the predictions of our theoretical model, based on the calibration procedure described in the main text.
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